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T
he current food crisis has several causes—rising 
demand for food and feed, biofuels, high oil prices, 
climate change, stagnant agricultural productivity 
growth—but there is increasing evidence that the crisis is 
being made worse by the malfunctioning of world grain 
markets. Given the thinness of major markets for cereals, 
the restrictions on grain exports imposed by dozens of 
countries have resulted in additional price increases. A 
number of countries have adopted retail price controls, 
creating perverse incentives for producers. Speculative 
bubbles have built up, and the gap between cash and 
futures prices has risen, stimulating overregulation in 
some countries and causing some commodity exchanges 
in Africa and Asia to halt grain futures trading. Some food 
aid donors have defaulted on food aid contracts. The World 
Food Programme (WFP) has had difficulty getting quick 
access to grain for its humanitarian operations. Developing 
countries are urgently rebuilding their national stocks and 
re-examining the “merits” of self-sufficiency policies for 
food security despite high costs.
These reactions began as consequences, not causes, of 
the price crisis, but they exacerbate the crisis and increase 
the risks posed by high prices. By creating a feedback loop 
with high food prices, they further increase price levels and 
volatility, with adverse consequences for the poor and for 
long-term incentives for agricultural production. Because 
they impede the free flow of food to where it is most 
needed and undermine the flow of price signals to farmers, 
these market failures impose enormous efficiency losses on 
the global food system, hitting the poorest countries and 
people hardest.
Why Is This Happening?
Changes in supply and demand fundamentals cannot 
fully explain the recent drastic increase in food prices. 
Rising expectations, speculation, and hoarding have 
also contributed to the increasing level and volatility 
of food prices. The flow of speculative capital from 
financial investors into agricultural commodity markets 
has increased drastically, as shown by the rise in the 
number of traded futures contracts in recent years 
(Figure 1). Excessive speculation in the commodity 
futures market can, in principle, push up not only 
futures prices but also spot prices above levels justified 
by supply and demand. Despite the fact that still more 
research is needed to clearly identify the causal links 
between speculation and cash prices, it is apparent that 
some activity in the futures market reflects a genuine 
concern about future supply and demand and a desire 
by consumers to hedge against risks.
To analyze whether recent price increases reflect 
higher levels of speculation or hedging activity, we 
examined weekly reports by the U.S. Commodity Futures 
Trading Commission (CFTC) on trading activities in 
futures markets by commercial and noncommercial 
traders. Commercial traders enter futures markets 
mainly for hedging purposes, whereas noncommercial 
traders speculate mainly in search of financial profits. 
We found that for maize, wheat, soybeans, and rice, 
the total number of positions in futures contracts 
by noncommercial traders as a fraction of the total 
positions (commercial plus noncommercial) has 
significantly increased in the past six months, implying 
the possibility of a price bubble above what is justified 
by fundamentals.
Appropriate global institutional arrangements for 
preventing these market failures are missing. A global 
solution that addresses the need for reliable emergency 
food supplies and prevents excessive speculation in food 
markets may be costly, but given the losses created by the 
crisis, it will still have large positive net returns.
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A traditional approach to coping with the market failures 
revealed by the food-price crisis would involve building up 
a physical, public, globally managed grain reserve. These 
reserves could be released to cope with excessive price 
increases. This option has the disadvantages, however, of 
high storage costs and slow transactions.
Alternatively, commodity exchanges could be reformed. 
The incentives for speculation in food commodities could 
be reduced by (1) limiting the volume of speculation 
relative to hedging through regulation; (2) making delivery 
on contracts or portions of contracts compulsory; and/or 
(3) imposing additional capital deposit requirements on 
futures transactions. These reforms could be implemented 
case by case or through an international alliance of 
commodity exchanges.
Difficulties could arise, however, in walking a 
line between ineffective regulators and overzealous 
ones. Market regulation also raises political economy 
concerns, such as lack of institutional capacity to 
implement and enforce regulations and the possibility 
that regulatory measures could benefit relatively  
small groups.
FIGURE 1—Monthly Traded Volumes of Futures Contracts, Chicago Board of Trade,  
January 2002 – May 2008
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Source:  Chicago Board of Trade.
Notes:  For wheat, soybeans, and maize, 1 contract = 5,000 bushels. 
























































































































































7.0Instead, we propose a new global institutional 
arrangement that would consist of two prongs:  
(1) a minimum physical grain reserve for humanitarian 
assistance, and (2) a virtual reserve and intervention 
mechanism to calm markets under speculative situations, 
backed up by a financial fund.
Prong 1: An independent emergency reserve.  A 
modest emergency reserve of around 300,000 metric 
tons of basic grains1—about 5 percent of the current 
food aid flows of 6.7 million wheat-equivalent 
metric tons—would be supplied by the main grain-
producing countries and funded by a group of countries 
participating in the scheme (that is, the Group of 
Eight Plus Five [G8+5] countries [Canada, France, 
Germany, Italy, Japan, Russia, the United Kingdom, the 
United States, Brazil, China, India, Mexico, and South 
Africa] and maybe others). This decentralized reserve 
would be located at strategic points near or in major 
developing-country regions, using existing national 
storage facilities. The reserve, to be used exclusively 
for emergency responses and humanitarian assistance, 
would be managed by the WFP. The WFP would have 
access to these grains at pre-crisis market prices, to 
reduce the need for short-term ad hoc fundraising. To 
cover the cost of restoring the reserve to its initial level, 
(i.e. the difference between the post-crisis price and the 
pre-crisis price times the quantity of reserves used by 
WFP), an emergency fund should be created and its level 
maintained by the participating countries.
Prong 2: A virtual global food commodity 
exchange.   A virtual reserve and intervention mechanism 
would be based on a coordinated commitment by 
the group of participating countries. Each of the 
countries would commit to supplying funds if needed 
for intervention in grain markets. Determining the size 
of this fund will require further analysis as commodity 
futures markets allow for high levels of leverage. For 
example, a fund of US$12 to 20 billion might cover 
30 to 50 percent of normal grain trade volume and be 
sufficient to send a strong signal if an intervention is 
needed. These resources would be promissory, or virtual, 
not actual budget expenditures.
Then, if needed, intervention in the futures markets 
would be guided by a high-level technical commission. 
This commission, which could be appointed by the 
group of participating countries on a permanent basis, 
would depend on a “global intelligence unit” to 
trigger the alarm that prices are significantly above 
their estimated dynamic price band (that is, lower and 
upper price limits) based on market fundamentals, and 
that intervention is needed. The intervention would 
consist of executing a number of silent short sells 
over a specific period of time (that is, selling a firm 
promise—or a futures contract—to deliver grain at a 
later date at the specified price) in futures markets 
around the world at a price lower than the current spot 
price. The global intelligence unit would recommend the 
price or series of prices to be offered in the short sells, 
which should move smoothly toward the upper limit of 
the estimated price band. This increase in the supply 
of future sells (short) should lower spot prices and 
minimize speculative attacks. In other words, the virtual 
fund will come into play only if there is a need to realize 
the future sells, in which case the fund will be used to 
obtain the necessary grains to comply and calm the 
markets. Usually, this action would not be necessary and 
the whole operation would stay virtual.2
We recommend intervening through futures markets 
(rather than spot markets) because under current tight 
market conditions, accumulating a global stock of grain 
large enough to calm markets is simply infeasible. The 
needed incremental supply is missing, and holding large 
grain reserves around the world would be inefficient. 
Moreover, to the extent food price rises were caused by a 
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1This number is based on current emergency requirements by the WFP which may be larger in the future.
2All contracts are ultimately settled either through liquidation by offsetting purchases or sales or through delivery of the actual physical commodity. An 
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speculative attack, the market would respond immediately 
to an intervention in the futures market, and the cost 
would be minimal, given that the selling positions at lower 
prices would be closed immediately.
The global intelligence unit, to be permanently funded 
by the participating countries, would have three main 
roles: (1) advising when the emergency stocks should be 
accessible to the WFP; (2) designing and implementing a 
dynamic price band system; and (3) triggering sales in the 
futures market by the high-level technical commission until 
a speculative attack is eliminated.
Mechanism to Monitor Compliance
One potential risk of cross-country coordinated institutional 
design is the probability that a member country will fail 
to comply with the agreed-upon commitments. To ensure 
that all participants in this new system comply with the 
agreed-upon rules, existing World Trade Organization (WTO) 
dispute resolution mechanisms could be used. If the WTO’s 
formal process for raising disputes for consultation fails to 
produce a satisfactory result, the matter moves to a hearing 
by a panel and possibly an appeal to the Appellate Body.
Toward an Effective World Food System
The G8+5, at their meeting in July 2008, should consider 
these and other options for calming global food markets. 
The World Bank should also initiate discussions on these 
issues with other global institutions and consider playing 
a lead role. Any solution must balance external regulation 
with internal corporate governance in a way that marries 
market development and welfare objectives. Some argue 
that achieving this balance is too difficult, but in fact the 
world cannot afford not to do so. Markets are needed to 
offer choices, but policymakers must play a role in assuring 
that the global food system meets the needs of the poor 
and vulnerable.